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ALLAN R. STEIN†
I predicted a few years ago that the greater connectedness
brought about by globalization in general, and technology in particu-
lar, would introduce a new humility into our jurisdictional attitudes.1
Jurisdictional and choice-of-law rules premised on hermetically sealed
sovereignty, where governments had exclusive power over their citi-
zens and territory, did not fit a world in which the power and influ-
ence of governments extended beyond their borders and collided
with conflicting legal norms within their borders.  Connectedness, I
concluded, would inevitably produce a new sensitivity in conflict of
laws to the multiple sources of power and authority with which people
must contend in a wired world.2 
Professors Berman and Reidenberg, while sympathetic with that
perspective, have here suggested an appropriate caveat:  technology
can both connect and separate, and globalization can turn govern-
ments both outward toward cooperation and inward toward isolation.
Connectedness can make us xenophobic as well as cosmopolitan.
Thus, Professor Reidenberg discusses how technology enables
states to exercise control over multistate electronic transactions in or-
der to enforce their own, legitimate regulatory preferences.3  He is
generally sympathetic to such assertions of national authority and re-
jects the plea of “Internet separatists” for governments to leave cyber-
space alone.4
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LEGAL F. 373, 374 (“[T]he old jurisdictional clothes do not fit the new body politic, but
we are not ready to donate them to Goodwill quite yet.”).
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See id. at 397 (predicting that technology and globalization will foreclose unilat-
eral assertions of jurisdiction and lead to reciprocal, expansive assertions of authority
between sovereigns).
3
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951
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Professor Berman, in contrast, finds the turn inward more trou-
bling.  He presents three “case studies” of “parochial” application of
forum law by American courts that suggest a disturbing trend.5  I want
to focus here principally on his essay.  Professor Berman asserts that a
“cosmopolitan” perspective would provide a better approach to multi-
state problems in an interconnected world.  Such an approach, he
suggests, should take account of the multiple communities with which
people increasingly affiliate, not merely the interests of affected gov-
ernments.6  This corresponds with Professor Berman’s earlier advo-
cacy of legal pluralism in cyberspace regulation, which called upon
courts to take account of the fact that legal norms are not produced
exclusively by governments, and other norm-generating communities
increasingly defy territorial definition.7
Berman’s cosmopolitanism melds two separate critiques into one:
a parochialism critique which bemoans the knee-jerk tendency of
courts to apply their own law without taking adequate account of the
extraterritorial implications of their adjudication, sometimes without
even recognizing the presence of a choice of law;8 and a pluralism cri-
tique which bemoans the tendency of courts to think about govern-
ment-generated legal norms as the only available sources of applicable
law.9
Professor Berman’s parochialism critique is embraced at some level
by most of the dominant approaches to conflict of laws, from Beale’s
vested rights theory to modern “substantivism.”  The core premise of
virtually every conflicts theory is a distinction between jurisdiction and
choice of law; just because a judge has authority to resolve a dispute
5
Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws:  Redefining
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV 1819 (2005).
6
See id. at 1859 (“Cosmopolitanism seeks ‘flexible citizenship,’ in which people
are permitted to shift identities amid a plurality of possible affiliations and allegiances.
These allegiances could also include nonterritorial communities, such as those found
in Internet chat rooms.” (footnote omitted)).
7
See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311,
323 (2002) (explaining that the pluralist theory of jurisdiction acknowledges the in-
volvement of nonstate communities in the creation of legal norms and the reshaping
of existing legal regimes).
8
See Berman, supra note 5, at 1823 (“[J]udges seem to assume that U.S. law should
apply, even without any sustained discussion of other possible outcomes.” (emphasis
omitted)).
9
See id. at 1862 (“[C]ourts should consider community affiliations that are not
associated with nation-states, such as industry standards, norms of behavior promul-
gated by non-governmental organizations, community custom, and rules associated
with particular activities, such as Internet usage.”).
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does not mean that forum law necessarily provides the appropriate
measure of the parties’ rights.10  As acknowledged by Professor Ber-
man, contemporary conflicts approaches already take into account the
multiplicity of states affected by the parties’ activities.11  Professor
Berman attempts to distinguish his approach from both the “most
significant relationship” focus of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws12 as well as the “reasonableness” test of the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law by his openness to nonterritorial, non-state-
generated, legal norms:
Perhaps most importantly, because a focus on community affiliation
may lead us to consider nonstate communities, a cosmopolitan framework
is far more likely to allow a pluralist consideration of how norms gener-
ated outside of formal governmental channels may bind sub-, supra-, and
transnational communities.
13
Yet, as discussed below,14 this pluralistic perspective is doing no
work in his case analysis.  His case analysis focuses exclusively on the
interest of affected states, not the interests of other nonterritorial
communities.  Drained of its pluralistic emphasis, “cosmopolitanism”
seems little more than a plea to avoid parochial choices of law.  Few, if
any, conflicts scholars would take issue with Professor Berman’s plea
that courts at least recognize the existence of a choice of law.  In this
sense of wanting courts to be other-regarding, we are all, or mostly all,
cosmopolitanists.  He is surely right that courts must be increasingly
attuned to the extraterritorial implications of their attempts to regu-
late global activity through adjudication.
Professor Berman’s parochialism critique of Brainard Currie’s “in-
terest analysis” is particularly trenchant.  It is myopic for courts to as-
10
This is not to say that forum law is not significantly privileged under some ap-
proaches, particularly under the realist tradition of Walter Wheeler Cook and Brainard
Currie.  But even under those least “cosmopolitan” approaches, application of forum
law was not considered an automatic consequence, but rather had to be reconciled
with the substantive policies of forum law.  If, because of some foreign elements, the
forum’s substantive policy would not be advanced, forum law was not automatically
applied.  See Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191,
1196-1204 (1987) (examining the critiques of territorialism).
11
Berman, supra note 5, at 1862-63 (discussing the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts).
12
Id. at 1862 (“It is unclear, however, whether [the ‘most significant relationship’
test of the Restatement] include[s] affiliations that are neither citizenship-based nor ter-
ritory-based.  In contrast, cosmopolitanism would acknowledge such additional affilia-
tions.”).  Professor Berman would also dispense with any presumptions concerning the
appropriate choice of law in particular categories of cases.  Id.
13
Id. at 1863-64.
14
See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
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sume that the only interest of the forum state is having its own law ap-
plied for the benefit of its own citizens.  States have a long-term inter-
est in crafting and enforcing a coherent transnational legal order:
[F]rom a long-term geopolitical perspective, whether or not an individ-
ual citizen wins a lawsuit is actually of very little interest to a state.  In-
stead, states may have an interest in being seen to comply with an
agreed-upon international order.  States benefit from a shared world sys-
tem, with its interlocking set of reciprocal benefits and burdens.  If a
state is too parochial in pursuit of its short-term interests, it may damage
its longer-term goals by creating a lack of trust in other states.
15
Unlike Professor Berman, I do see evidence that courts are increas-
ingly sensitive to this perspective.  The evolution of the courts’ per-
sonal jurisdiction doctrine in Internet-related disputes suggests that
courts are coming to appreciate that excessive assertions of authority
can unduly inhibit extraterritorial activity beyond the courts’ legiti-
mate regulatory authority.16
The more innovative, but less convincing, piece of Professor Ber-
man’s critique is his suggestion that courts need to be more other-
regarding not only toward competing legal rules promulgated by gov-
ernments, but toward norms of behavior generated by nongovern-
mental, nonterritorial communities:
Such a jurisprudence looks to a variety of possible legal sources.
First, courts can consider the multiple domestic norms of nation-states
affected by the dispute. . . . Second, international treaties, agreements,
or other statements of evolving international or transnational norms may
provide relevant guidance.  Third, courts should consider community af-
filiations that are not associated with nation-states, such as industry stan-
dards, norms of behavior promulgated by non-governmental organiza-
tions, community custom, and rules associated with particular activities,
such as Internet usage.
17
This critique resonates with the seminal and controversial work by
David Post and David Johnson advocating a hands-off approach to
internet regulation in deference to the self-regulating norms gener-
ated by the community of Internet users.18  I have previously expressed
15
Berman, supra note 5, at 1850.
16
See Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet:  Seeing Due Process Through
the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 444-46 (2004) (discussing the in-
creasing reluctance of courts to assert personal jurisdiction on the basis of a defen-
dant’s Internet activity).
17
Berman, supra note 5, at 1862.
18
See generally David R. Johnson & David G. Post, The Rise of Law on the Global Net-
work, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE:  INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFOR-
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skepticism that the universe of Internet users was a sufficiently coher-
ent community to generate the kind of legal order to which states
sometimes defer.19  I am equally skeptical that courts could make
sense out of treating litigants as “cosmopolitan patriots,”20 with rights
and obligations defined not merely by reference to the law of the gov-
ernments with connections to their controversy, but by reference to
their “multiple overlapping communities.”21
None of the parochialism that Professor Berman identifies in the
case law is in any way attributable to an excessive focus on state as op-
posed to nonstate or nonterritorial interests.22  Indeed, if we look care-
fully at the cases discussed by Professor Berman, I’m not sure that we
can even discern a pattern of parochialism, let alone recognize a prob-
lem that could be advanced by a pluralistic perspective.
In two out of the three cases discussed in the essay, Professor
Berman concludes that the courts ultimately reached a defensible
outcome in applying their own law.  First, in the GlobalSanteFe23 case,
Professor Berman discusses the court’s conclusion that it was appro-
priate to apply U.S. law to a Korean defendant who registered a do-
main name for the specific purpose of extorting money from a U.S.
corporation.24  One does not even have to abandon territorialism, let
alone become cosmopolitan, to recognize that a forum state has a le-
gitimate interest in providing a remedy for intentional extraterritorial
wrongdoing targeted at a forum resident.25  As I have noted in the
MATION INFRASTRUCTURE 3, 12 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997) (calling for
new regulatory structures that better accommodate Internet transactions that are
wholly unrelated to any particular physical location).
19
See Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 INT’L
LAW. 1167, 1171-73 (1998).
20
Berman, supra note 5, at 1858 (quoting Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan
Patriots, in COSMOPOLITICS:  THINKING AND FEELING BEYOND THE NATION 91, 91
(Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins eds., 1998)).
21
Id. at 1860.
22
Professor Berman concedes this point.  See id. at 1821 (“I leave to a future article
the issue of how the insights of legal pluralism might inform conflict of laws.”).
23
GlobalSanteFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va.
2003).
24
See Berman, supra note 5, at 1826-29.
25
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 65 (1934) (“If consequences
of an act done in one state occur in another state, each state in which any event in the
series of act and consequences occurs may exercise legislative jurisdiction to create
rights or other interest as a result thereof.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c) (1987) (authorizing a state to ap-
ply its law to cases involving “conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory”); see also Stein, supra note 16, at 445 (suggest-
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personal jurisdiction context, such targeted, intentional wrongdoing
lends itself to extraterritorial regulation by the affected state without
generating significant friction with the regulatory interests of other
states.26
Professor Berman may be right that the court’s unarticulated as-
sumption that U.S. law applies as an automatic consequence of the
court having personal jurisdiction is a less persuasive rationale than
the defendant’s targeted wrongdoing in GlobalSantaFe.27  But the court
could not have asserted subject matter jurisdiction unless there was
some nexus with the United States in the first place:  the Lanham Act
provides for in rem jurisdiction only if “the domain name violates any
right of the owner of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark
Office, or protected under subsection (a) or (c) of [the Act].”28  In
order to fall within the Lanham Act, a mark must be used “in com-
merce,”29 meaning that there must be some actual use of the mark in
the U.S. market.30  A mark not used in the United States is not en-
forceable under the Act.31  In a case having no connection with the
United States, the mere registration by a foreign defendant of a do-
ing a jurisdictional distinction between intentional cybersquatting and negligent
trademark infringement).
26
See Stein, supra note 16, at 421-22 (arguing that intentional tortfeasors “should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in the affected state (quoting World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
27
See Berman, supra note 5, at 1828 (“[T]he court seems to assume that the
ACPA’s legal reach is limited solely by the scope of the court’s jurisdiction, not by any
choice-of-law considerations.”).
28
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
29
The “use in commerce” requirement is an express requirement for trademark
registration, id. § 1051(a)(1), and has been treated as an implied restriction on the
protection of unregistered marks.  See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:2, at 29-7 (4th ed. 2005) (“Priority of
trademark rights in the United States depends solely upon priority of use in the United
States, not on priority of use anwhere in the world.”); accord Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV.
885, 909 n.85 (2004).
30
Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that
mere advertising in a U.S. market is not sufficient to constitute “use in commerce” for
the purpose of the Lanham Act unless it is accompanied by any actual rendering of
services in the United States).  But see Int’l Bancorp v. Societe des Bains de Mer, 329
F.3d 359, 355-56 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the provision of services abroad to U.S.
residents in conjunction with advertising in the United States constitutes “use in com-
merce” notwithstanding absence of services rendered in the United States), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 1052 (2004).  See generally Dinwoodie, supra note 29, at 908-19 (discussing the
“use in commerce” requirement).
31
See Dinwoodie, supra note 29, at 909 (“Use of a mark in a foreign country cre-
ates no rights in the United States.”).
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main name in Virginia could not provide the basis for in rem jurisdic-
tion because the plaintiff would not be asserting the infringement of a
mark protected under U.S. law.  Moreover, a case for cybersquatting
must be based on a “bad faith” registration, i.e., intentional harm to-
ward the owner of a U.S. mark.32 
Of course, not every decision protecting a U.S. mark will present
as strong a case as does GlobalSanteFe for applying U.S. law and assert-
ing in rem jurisdiction.  GlobalSanteFe is a particularly strong case inso-
far as the plaintiff was a U.S. corporation, not merely the owner of a
trademark protected under U.S. law.  Moreover, the 2002 decision in
Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names33 has the potential for creat-
ing mischief.34  In Harrods, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that the in rem provision could be applied to claims involving
mere infringement rather than just being limited to “bad faith” cyber-
squatting.35  If and when courts use the in rem provision to assert ju-
risdiction and apply U.S. law where there has been no targeted in-
fringement toward a mark used in the U.S. market, and no direct use
of a U.S. name registrar, there may be a greater problem.36  But we are
not there quite yet.
Similarly, in the Yahoo! case, the court of appeals ultimately de-
cided that it had no jurisdiction to declare that the French litigants
could not enforce their injunction against Yahoo! in the United
States.37  Hardly parochial protectionism.  But even focusing on the
district court’s grant of declaratory relief, I see the issue of enforcing
foreign injunctions as more complicated than other recognition prob-
lems.  Professor Berman faults the district court for equating the deci-
sion about whether enforcement of the judgment would violate the
First Amendment with the question of whether the U.S. court could
have constitutionally issued the underlying judgment.38  But his cri-
32
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(A)(i) (2000).
33
302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002).
34
Unlike GlobalSanteFe, the defendant in Harrods directly availed itself of the Vir-
ginia registry.  Id. at 221.
35
Id. at 232.
36
See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace:
Problems with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989,
1004 (2002) (“Whether or not the use of a U.S.-based dealer creates minimum contacts,
it seems clear that the involvement of a U.S.-based administrator, without more, should
not create the requisite contacts.”).
37
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisémitisme, 379 F.3d 1120
(9th Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc granted, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005).
38
Berman, supra note 5, at 1837, 1879.
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tique does not take account of the type of judgment for which en-
forcement was sought.  The district court was not merely being asked
to deny recognition to a foreign judgment that it could not have con-
stitutionally issued; the question was whether U.S. courts could help
effectuate the French court’s injunction of protected speech in the
United States.39  That is surely more constitutionally problematic than
enforcing a distasteful or even unconstitutional money judgment.
The prospective impact of the French injunction makes an enforcing
court more complicit in the underlying prior restraint of speech.40
Thus, even a “cosmopolitan” court finely attuned to the competing le-
gal regimes applicable to the litigants’ behavior would be appropri-
ately concerned about betraying its domestic constitutional commit-
ments in a case like this.  Professor Berman concedes this in
describing the decision as a “difficult case.”41
39
The precise form of U.S. assistance—issuance of a U.S. injunction, or enforce-
ment of monetary penalties—was never made clear in the case.  The district court as-
serted that Yahoo! incurred daily monetary fines for its nonconformance with the
French injunction.  However, the court also noted that no fines had, in fact, been im-
posed by the French court, nor had the French plaintiff taken any steps to enforce the
French judgment in the United States.  169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2001),
rev’d, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004).  Professor Reidenberg suggests that Yahoo! may
not have even been in violation of the French order; the American courts may have
misunderstood the scope of the French injunction as a consequence of a translation
error.  Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 1959.
40
Whether or not this would constitute an unconstitutional “prior restraint” is
complicated.  “[A]dministrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communica-
tions when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur” are
considered presumptively unconstitutional under the “prior restraint” doctrine.  Alex-
ander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (internal quotation marks and em-
phasis omitted); see also Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)
(recognizing a “heavy presumption” against prior restraint on expression).  But see
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 778-79 (1994) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part) (asserting that “injunctive relief should be judged by a more lenient stan-
dard than legislation” because it is more narrowly tailored).  Professsor Tribe has sug-
gested that the problem with prior restraints is that the speaker may incur a penalty for
disobeying the restraint without being given the opportunity to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the restraint.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
12-35 (2d ed. 1988); cf. Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in
First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 97 (1984) (suggesting that injunctions issued
after “a full and fair hearing by a competent judicial forum” raise fewer constitutional
difficulties).  The French injunction was issued following an adjudication on the mer-
its, but that court did not evaluate whether or not the speech was protected under U.S.
law.  Any U.S. judicial enforcement of that injunction might therefore be considered
an illegal prior restraint insofar as the speaker was not accorded a constitutional adju-
dication prior to incurring a penalty for violating the injunction.
41
Berman, supra note 5, at 1878.
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Moreover, even putting aside the First Amendment implications,
courts have traditionally been more cautious about recognizing for-
eign injunctions than about enforcing foreign money judgments, even
in domestic cases.42  Even in a domestic context, it is was not clear un-
til recently that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required states to give
recognition to injunctions issued by sister states, and the scope of the
enforcement obligation remains unclear.43  Enforcement of foreign
injunctions is yet more problematic given the potential for imposing
upon the enforcing court vastly divergent legal norms. The automatic
issuance of a U.S. injunction as the means to enforce a foreign injunc-
tion would strain the notion that such equitable relief is discretion-
ary,44 and the award of a fine for defendant’s violation of a foreign in-
junction would strain the principle that foreign fines and penalties are
not generally entitled to recognition.45  The uniquely problematic as-
pect of enforcing injunctions thus is recognized by the ALI Interna-
42
Such recognition was not required under the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
but was mandated in the Second Restatement.  Compare RESTATEMENT  (FIRST) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 449(2) (1934), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 102 (1971).
43
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 223 (1998).  In Baker, the Court held
that while the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires enforcement of equity decrees, it
did not require a Missouri court to exclude the testimony of a former General Motors
employee who had been enjoined by a Michigan court from disclosing to third parties
proprietary information about General Motors:  “Full faith and credit, however, does
not mean that enforcement measures must travel with the sister state judgment as pre-
clusive effects do; such measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of forum
law.”  Id. at 223-24.
44
This was the primary rationale for denying the enforcement of sister-state in-
junctions under RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 449 cmt. a (1934)
(“Each court will decide for itself whether to leave the plaintiff to his ordinary remedy
or to give him the extraordinary alternative relief.”).
45
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 483 (1987) (“Courts in the United States are not required to recognize or to
enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the
courts of other states.”).  Although the courts have gone out of their way to character-
ize foreign law as nonpenal for purposes of this provision, see, e.g., Desjardins Du-
charme v. Hunnewell, 585 N.E.2d 321, 324 (Mass. 1992) (finding that an award of costs
in a Canadian judgment did not constitute a “penalty”), the fines allegedly incurred by
Yahoo! would seem to fall squarely within the scope of the provisions:  “A penal judg-
ment, for purposes of this section, is a judgment in favor of a foreign state or one of its
subdivisions, and primarily punitive rather than compensatory in character.  A judg-
ment for a fine or penalty is within this section . . . .”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 483 cmt. b; cf. American Law Insti-
tute, International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project, Tentative Draft No. 2, § 2(b)(i)
(Apr. 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (“Judgments for taxes, fines, and penalties
may, but need not, be recognized and enforced.”), available at http://www.ali.org/ali/
IJ&J2004.pdf.
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tional Jurisdiction and Judgments Project, which makes foreign in-
junctions only contingently enforceable in the United States.46
Professor Berman’s best case for demonstrating excessive parochi-
alism is the Barcelona.com decision.47  This is the only case in which
Professor Berman finds the application of U.S. law indefensible.  But
it is not clear how much the case really supports a charge of parochial-
ism.  At issue was the ownership of the “barcelona.com” domain
name.  The use of the name by Barcelona.com (Bcom)48 apparently
violated Spanish, but not U.S., trademark law.  Following an interna-
tional arbitration in favor of the City of Barcelona pursuant to the
resolution dispute policy of the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN),49 Bcom sought a declaration in the
district court that “its use of the name [barcelona.com] does not in-
fringe upon any trademark of defendant . . . [and] that [the City
Council] is barred from instituting any action against [Bcom] for
trademark infringement.”50
Under Rule 4(k) of the ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP), the arbitration award for the city was
automatically suspended upon the filing of any judicial proceeding in
a court of competent jurisdiction.51  The suspension continues until
the registrar receives:
(i) evidence satisfactory to us of a resolution between the parties; (ii)
evidence satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been dismissed or with-
drawn; or (iii) a copy of an order from such court dismissing your lawsuit
or ordering that you do not have the right to continue to use your do-
main name.
52
The court of appeals ruled in Bcom’s favor on the basis that the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)53 only provided
46
American Law Institute, supra note 45, § 2(b)(ii) (“Declaratory judgments and
injunctions or comparable orders are not directly enforceable, but may be entitled to
recognition provided they meet the criteria of this Act.”).
47 Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617
(4th Cir. 2003).
48
The name was registered by the incorporators of Barcelona.com (Bcom).  Bcom
was then formed to commercially exploit the name.  330 F.3d at 620.
49
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.
htm#4 (last modified Feb. 5, 2002) [hereinafter UDRP].
50
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 621 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in
original).
51
See id. at 626-27.
52
UDRP, supra note 49.
53
Pub. L. No. 106-13, div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501, 1536 (1999) (enacting
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remedies for the violation of U.S. trademark law, and Bcom, there-
fore, was entitled to a declaration that its registration of the barce-
lona.com domain name did not violate the Act.54  The case thus might
be seen to support a charge of legal imperialism; unless Bcom’s regis-
tration of the barcelona.com domain name violated U.S. law, the city
could not force the transfer of the domain name pursuant to the arbi-
tration order.  As Professor Berman put it, the court “eschewed Span-
ish law and insisted on applying the ACPA.”55
However, the peculiar procedural posture of the case may under-
mine that characterization.  Contrary to Professor Berman’s sugges-
tion, it is not clear that the court privileged U.S. law over Spanish law.
At issue here is the court’s construction of the “reverse anti-
cybersquatting” provision of the Lanham Act:
A domain name registrant whose domain name has been suspended,
disabled, or transferred [pursuant to a policy of a domain name regis-
trar] may . . . file a civil action to establish that the registration or use of
the domain name by such registrant is not unlawful under this chapter.
The court may grant injunctive relief to the domain name registrant, in-
cluding the reactivation of the domain name or transfer of the domain
name to the domain name registrant.
56
In the domestic context, the provision operates simply as a hedge
against possible legal errors inherent in the expedited, “adjudication-
lite” context of ICANN arbitration.57  If the arbitration erroneously
finds a trademark violation, the registrant can seek de novo judicial
review under this section.58
The application of the provision to international disputes is more
complex.  What happens when the arbitration results in a transfer of a
domain name not as a result of a mistaken interpretation of U.S. law,
but because such a result is justified under foreign law?  Does the pro-
vision require a court to reverse the arbitration on the premise that
only justifiable basis for a transfer by the arbitrator is when the regis-
tration violates U.S. trademark law?  Or is the provision limited in
scope to correcting erroneous constructions of U.S. trademark law in
the arbitration?  Under the latter construction, a registrant might be
S. 1948, tit. 3, 106th Cong. (1999)) (codified in scattered sections of 15 & 16 U.S.C.
(2000)).
54
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 629.
55
Berman, supra note 5, at 1830.
56
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) (2000).
57
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 624.
58
Id. at 626.
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able to get a declaratory judgment that its registration did not violate
the Lanham Act, but such a declaration would not immunize its regis-
tration from other attacks, including claimed violations of foreign law,
and would not result in automatic vacation/injunction of the arbitra-
tion award. 
Professor Berman’s critique assumes the court adopted the former
construction.59  This reading is not without support in the opinion.
The court does “reverse and remand” the district court’s denial of de-
claratory relief to Bcom, and reverses its issuance of an injunction or-
dering the transfer of the domain name to the city.60  The court also
notes the power of courts hearing ACPA claims to reverse arbitration
decisions “grounded on principles foreign or hostile to American
law.”61  Moreover, it is clear from the decision that U.S. courts are
without competence under the doctrine of “territoriality” to “enter-
tain actions seeking to enforce trademark rights that exist only under
foreign law.”62  Thus, the district court was without authority to af-
firmatively order the transfer of the domain name to the city pursuant
to Spanish law.63  But that does not mean that the district court must now set
aside the arbitration award simply because the registration was not in violation
of the Lanham Act.
The key question, then, is what relief specifically Bcom is entitled
to on remand under the appellate court’s disposition.  Must the arbi-
tration be reversed and the transfer enjoined because the arbitration
decision was not premised on any Lanham Act violation by Bcom (and
therefore constitutes a decision “foreign or hostile to American law”)?
Or was the court simply indicating that Bcom was entitled to a decla-
ration that its registration was not in violation of the Lanham Act (but
the arbitration may be sustained because the registration was in viola-
tion of other law)?  The former construction would support Professor
Berman’s charge of parochialism; the latter would not.
A middle ground may be that the city cannot obtain a transfer of
the domain name unless and until some national court confirms the
59
Cf. Laurence R. Helfer, Whither the UDRP:  Autonomous, Americanized, or Cosmopoli-
tan?, 12 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 493, 498 (2004) (“[U]nless foreign mark owners
can also demonstrate trademark rights under U.S. law, nothing will prevent registrants
from proving that their use of the domain name embodying a foreign mark was lawful
under the Lanham Act.”).
60
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 629.
61
Id. at 626.
62
Id. at 628.
63
The court did not have to reach this issue, since the parties agreed that the city
did not, in fact, assert any counterclaims for injunction.  Id. at 629.
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conclusion of the arbitration that Bcom’s registration in fact violated
the city’s rights under Spanish law.  This would be a consequence not
of the ACPA per se, but of the ICANN arbitration policy.  Under Rule
4(k) of the URDP, the registrar held the arbitration award in suspen-
sion pending judicial resolution of the parties’ dispute.  It may well be
that ICANN would read even a mere declaratory judgment for Bcom
to mean that there has either been no judicial resolution, or that
there has been a judicial resolution in Bcom’s favor.  In either event,
the arbitration award would never be implemented.  However, such
an outcome would not preclude the city from establishing a violation
of Spanish law in a Spanish court.  The ACPA would not insulate
Bcom from the duty to transfer the domain name if enforcement of
the Spanish judgment were sought in the United States, although
there would be some interesting res judicata questions for an enforc-
ing court to sort out.64  Note that even in this middle ground, the
“hegemonic” effect of U.S. law would be a consequence not of the
ACPA, but of ICANN’s own policy.
The Barcelona.com case thus lends itself to a range of interpreta-
tions with differing implications for Professor Berman’s thesis.  Profes-
sor Berman may have the right construction, but I would like to re-
serve judgment until we see a less ambiguous case.
In conclusion, none of the three cases that Professor Berman fo-
cuses on clearly demonstrates a trend toward parochialism.  All three
end up applying U.S. law, but for defensible, nonparochial reasons.
Moreover, the sources of non-U.S. legal authority to which Berman
suggests the courts look in these cases were exclusively state-
generated, territorially based legal rules.  Legal pluralism is doing no
work here.
None of this detracts from my enormous admiration for Professor
Berman.  He is unquestionably one of the most provocative, deep
thinkers in the conflicts/cyberlaw field today.  I am just not sure that
64
Even if the U.S. enforcing court were to look to U.S. rather than Spanish pre-
clusion law, the ACPA judgment would not necessarily preclude enforcement of the
Spanish judgment in this scenario to the extent that a judgment does not typically bar
claims that could not have been asserted in the initial proceeding.  See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (1982) (noting that a claim is not barred when it
could not have been brought in the initial proceeding due to jurisdictional limita-
tions); see also Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382
(1985) (“[C]laim preclusion generally does not apply where ‘[t]he plaintiff was unable
to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy [. . .] because of the
limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts . . . .’” (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (second alteration in original)).
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the problem is as bad as he suggests, or that adopting a “cosmopol-
itanism vision” gives us any greater insight into these complex choice-
of-law problems.
